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TRIPS AGREEMENT 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASEAN 
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER 
TECHNOLOGY 
MARIE WILSON· 
The new Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Agreement (the TRIPs Agreement), a result of the recent 
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
Uruguay Round, represents a major step toward 
providing the global trading system with more effective 
rules and enforcement procedures for the protection of all 
forms of intellectual property. The author presents a 
comprehensive analysis of the TRIPs Agreement 
requirements and of their ramifications for intellectual 
property protection and enforcement in the Association of 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The paper concludes with 
an assessment of the future ofcomputer technology 
protection in the ABEAN countries. 
• Marie Wilson obtained her J.D. degree from the University of Minnesota Law 
School in 1979 and earned her LL.M. in International Legal Studies from Golden Gate 
University Law School in 1996. She is an attorney in the corporate legal department of 
American Protective Services, Inc. in Oakland, California. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most significant results of the recent General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round is the 
new Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the TRIPs 
Agreement) agreement which adds intellectual property rules 
to the global trading system. the TRIPs Agreement requires all 
members of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) to have 
substantive minimum patent, copyright, trademark, trade 
secret, layout design, and industrial design laws, as well as 
meaningful enforcement procedures. 
This paper addresses the ramifications of the TRIPs Agreement 
on intellectual property protection and enforcement of 
computer technology within the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Member nations - Thailand, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and 
Vietnam! are diverse in socio-economic, religious, 
ideological, and legal experiences, but together they form one of 
the most successful regional organizations in the world, with a 
population of about 450 million people.2 ASEAN nations with 
the exception of Vietnam are WTO members and are directly 
obligated to comply with the TRIPs Agreement.3 
The ASEAN region is experiencing rapid modernization and 
economic growth.4 The shift of the past few years from central 
governmental control and agricultural economies toward 
information-based and market-driven economies5 has fueled 
1. Laos, Kampuchea, and Myanmar (formerly Burma) have achieved observer 
status. 
2. ASEAN was established in 1967 to achieve politic~ economic, function~ and 
external relations security. Brunei joined in 1984 and Vietnam in 1995. See ASEAN 
Documents Series 1967-1988 45 (3rd ed.), and ASEAN, Twenty-Eighth ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting, Brunei Darassalam 10-20 (July 28, 1995). See also JOHN 
NAISBI'IT, MEGATRENDSAsIA 121-122 (1996). 
3. Observers Kampuchea and Laos are also not WTO members. 
4. Five of ten emerging Asian economies are ASEAN members -- Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. See NAISBI'IT, supra note 2. 
5. Vietnam's shift to market-driven forces is the most dramatic, with Malaysia 
proving to be an exceptional example of successful privatization and the Philippines 
leading in privatizing infrastructure. See NAISBI'IT, supra note 2, at 110-116, 164-187. 
See also Dhiraphol Suwanprateep, Thailand, IP AsIA 1994 HIGHLIGHTS 35 (1994). 
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unprecedented economic cooperation among ASEAN members 
and has resulted in a number of economic agreements, 
including the late-1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Intellectual Property Cooperation (ASEAN Framework 
Agreement).6 This agreement commits all ASEAN members 
including Vietnam to establish effective intellectual property 
protection regimes and to comply with the TRIPs Agreement? 
As South East Asia comes of age and becomes an increasingly 
significant economic region of the world, computer 
manufacturing, sales, and technology transfers are growing in 
importance. ASEAN's computer import and export markets are 
rapidly expanding and six of ten Asian "growth triangles" now 
involve ASEAN members.s ASEAN and non-ASEAN 
investment in computer technology is expanding and this is 
likely to continue as interregional growth hubs play an 
increasingly significant role in the ASEAN economy.9 
6. See ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation, (Dec. 
15, 1995), 35 ILM 1072 (1996) (hereinafter ASEAN Framework Agreement). 
7. [d. see also NAISBITT, supra note 2, at 108-145. 
8. Growth triangles include the golden quadrangle (southwest China, Burma, 
Thailand and Laos); South China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and northeastern 
Thailand; the straits growth triangle (Singapore, Malaysia's Johor state and 
Indonesia's Riau province); the northern growth triangle (northern Malaysia, southern 
Thailand, and northern Sumatra in Indonesia); the Sulu Sea-based growth circle 
(Borneo parts governed by Malaysia and Indonesia, northern Sulawesi, and the 
southern Philippines); and the growth circle (Sulawesi province, Indonesia and the 
Northern Territory, Australia). See NAISBITT, supra note 2, at 127 (quoting Asia Inc.). 
See also id. at 126. 
9. John Naisbitt in his 1996 book, Megatrends Asia, notes: 
Where is a new millionaire to invest? In Asia, the answer is often 
right next door. Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, 
where costs are still low, attract their neighbors' wealth. The result is 
the creation of interregional growth hubs, each of which offers a 
critical element in support of industry. One such hub ties Singapore 
to Southern Malaysia and the Indonesian archipelago in support of a 
burgeoning electronics industry. Singapore brings the technological 
know how, and the telecommunications and transportation 
infrastructure, while Malaysia and Indonesia offer labor, water, and 
electric power. It's a dynamic triad, win-win-win situation. A similar 
effort links Malaysia and Indonesia to Thailand. NAESBITT, supra 
note 2, at 166. It should also be noted that Motorola and National 
Semiconductor are manufacturing in Singapore, and Hewlett-Packard 
also has a production and a research and development center there. 
Additionally, Hewlett-Packard has just moved its Palo Alto, 
California hard disk drive base to Penang, Malaysia. Id.at 110-111, 
120,122. 
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Part II of this paper explains the importance of ASEAN 
intellectual property protection of computer technology, 
ASEAN efforts to date, the TRIPs Agreement, and the recent 
ASEAN Framework Agreement. lO Part III addresses 
substantive ASEAN intellectual property laws, related TRIPs 
Agreement requirements, and the implications of the TRIPs 
Agreement for ASEAN protection of computer technology. Part 
IV analyzes ASEAN intellectual property enforcement laws 
and intergovernmental· dispute resolution, related TRIPs 
Agreement requirements, and the implications of the TRIPs 
Agreement for ASEAN enforcement and dispute resolution. 
Part V summarizes and also predicts the future of ASEAN 
intellectual property protection and enforcement. 
II. OVERVIEWS 
A. IMPORTANCE OF ASEAN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 
Computer technology is a major item of trade in the world 
today and this is true for ASEAN members as well. ASEAN 
nations seek to develop and maintain "home-grown" computer 
technology industries and attract much-needed investment.ll 
They also wish to incorporate state of the art computer 
technology into their production methods, telecommunications 
infrastructures, and schools.12 
One obstacle to achieving ASEAN's computer technology dream 
has been deficiencies in domestic intellectual property law. For 
years ASEAN nations have placed a low value on individual 
rights, including intellectual property rights.13 ASEAN 
intellectual property laws have also struggled to keep pace 
with rapidly changing technology.14 The largely national and 
10. See supra note 6. 
11. See Suwanprateep, supra note 5, at 35. 
12. See NAlSBI'IT, supra note 2, at 165-166, 183. 
13. A common attitude has been that intellectual property belongs to the public. See 
Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global 
Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L & ECON. 327, 329 (1993-1994). 
14. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright 
Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. (1994). See also Paul Edward Geller, New Dynamics in 
International Copyright, 16 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 461, 464-67 (1993). 
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territorial nature of intellectual property laws together with 
these struggles have resulted in wide variations, even within 
ASEAN, in the nature, scope, and adequacy of intellectual 
property protection and enforcement.15 For example, hard disk 
manufacturers can expect a high level of intellectual property 
protection from the well-developed Singaporean legal system; a 
moderate level from the rapidly changing Thai legal system; a 
low level from the Indonesian and Filipino legal systems;16 and 
a very low level from the piecemeal 'and corrupt Vietnamese 
legal systemP 
As the value of intellectual property rights has skyrocketed 
during the past ten years18 computer technology companies and 
developed nations have become increasingly concerned about 
rampant piracy and counterfeiting of valuable computer 
technology.19 As a consequence, intellectual property protection 
and enforcement has become an important trade issu~o and a 
source of significant tension between ASEAN nations and their 
principal trade partners - the United States, Europe, Japan, 
and China. A growing number of ASEAN computer technology 
companies have also become concerned.21 
ASEAN nations are more and more realizing the significance of 
intellectual property rights. There is growing recognition that 
15. Jeffrey Blatt, Intellectual Property: Quantifying Global Inrwvation in COMPo 
INTELL.PROP. L. & TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 2 (Chulalongkom University, Bangkok, 
Thailand 1996). 
16. Peter Popovich, The Clinton Administration's Efforts to Protect U.S. Intellectual 
Property in the Pacific Rim, Remarks to the HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REV. 10, 11 
(Jan. 27, 1996). 
17. Vietnam's People's Court system is notoriously unjust, particularly regarding its 
treatment of foreigners. Adam Schwarz, Focus Vietnam: Trade & Investment -- The 
Problems of Progress, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Oct. 26, 1995, at 50. 
18. Ironically, as the research and development costs of creating new computer 
technology and products have skyrocketed, new computer reproductive technologies 
have made copying less expensive. See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting U.S. Intellectual 
Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 275 (1991). 
19. Piracy connotes intentional and systematic misappropriation of intellectual 
property. Counterfeiting refers to the practice of passing off and false labeling of goods. 
20. Jeffrey Blatt, Comparative Intellectual Property Law and Techrwlogy Transfer, 
Lecture at Chulalongkom University (June 18, 1996). 
21. See NAISBITT, supra note 12, at 164-187. For example, major Thai exports are 
now computer parts and electronic integrated circuits, and software use and 
manufacturing are increasing. See Suwanprateep, supra note 5, at 35. 
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piracy and counterfeiting have a cost. They deprive ASEAN 
nations of licensing income, lower production, reduce trading 
and investment opportunities,22 and interfere with the 
attraction of much-needed foreign investment, innovation, and 
technology transfers. Strong, fair, and effective ASEAN 
intellectual property laws will stimulate foreign investment, 
technology transfers, and ASEAN success in the global trading 
system,23 and offer long-term benefits of enhanced employment, 
economic development,24 and innovation.25 
B. THE TRIPs AGREEMENT 
Persistent efforts by developed nations and the business 
community in the framework of the Uruguay Round led to the 
conclusion of the WTO and the TRIPs Agreements, which add 
intellectual property rules to the global trading system?6 
Members must now meet significant standards of patent, 
copyright, trademark, trade secret, layout design of integrated 
circuits, and industrial design protection and provide national 
systems that ensure effective enforcement of these rights. The 
TRIPs Agreement builds on and works in conjunction with 
existing international treaties, requiring all WTO members to 
follow the Berne and Paris Conventions,27 and the Washington 
22. See Giunta & Shang, supra note 13, at 327, 331. 
23. High levels of intellectual property protection and certainty are important 
prerequisites for many companies in determining whether and where to do business, 
invest, or engage in technology transfers. 
24. Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection 
in Developing Countries, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1279 (1994). 
25. See Giunta & Shang, supra note 13, at 327, 331. Creators need to be able to 
recover their billions of dollars in research and development costs if they are to be 
willing to continue to develop new computer technology benefiting ASEAN members. 
26. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Punta del Este, GATT B.LS.D. 
(33rd Supp.) at 19, 25 (1986). Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 5, 1994, 33 LL.M. 1143 (Uruguay of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT», Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994); Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to WTO Agreement, 33 LL.M. 1226 
(1994) [hereinafter DSUJ; and The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Annex 1C to WTO Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPs Agreement]. 
27. Long before the TRIPs Agreement, the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (1883, as revised 1967) [hereinafter Paris 
Convention), and Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
828 U.N.T.S. 221 (1886, as revised 1971 and amended 1979) [hereinafter Berne 
6
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Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated 
Circuits.28 In addition, the TRIPs Agreement requires detailed 
administrative, civil, and criminal remedies to protect 
individual rightholders,29 and is the first multilateral 
intellectual property agreement that is enforceable between 
nations in dispute settlement proceedings.30 National and most 
favored nation treatment are also required. 
Developed countries were obligated to implement national 
treatment and most favored nation treatment by January 1, 
1996. The TRIPs Agreement recognizes that others need 
technical assistance and expertise to comply fully.3t Developing 
countries and countries in transition from centrally-planned to 
market economies must implement the agreement by 200oa2 
and by 2005, for previously uncovered patent protection.33 
Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei are 
classified as developing countries. Singapore is likely to be 
classified as developed and is already in substantial the TRIPs 
Agreement compliance.34 Vietnam, though a non-WTO 
Convention], began to establish minimum rights for intellectual property protection. 
The TRIPs Agreement does not require WTO members to implement Berne's moral 
rights provision. 
28. Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integra ted Circuits, 28 
I.L.M. 1477 (1989) [hereinafter WashingtonlIPIC Treaty]; TRIPs Agreement arts. 1(3), 
2(1), 9(1). See also supra note 26. 
29. TRIPs Agreement arts. 41-61. 
30. Though the Paris and Berne Conventions, supra note 27, establish minimum 
levels of intellectual property protection, they lack enforcement mechanisms. 
31. National treatment obligations require members to provide treatment to 
nationals of other members no less favorable than that accorded to their own nationals. 
Most favored nation obligations require members to accord to other members the 
advantages, favors, privileges, and immunities relating to the protection of intellectual 
property granted other nations. See TRIPs Agreement arts. 3 and 4. Customs unions 
and free-trade area exclusions permit lowered tariffs on wide categories of intra-
ASEAN merchandise and the ASEAN-Free Trade Area (AFTA) planned by 2008. See 
GATT art. XXIV. See also ASEAN Free Trade Area, Flashfax Information Series, Doc. 
2008, 1 (Sept. 1995). 
32. TRIPs Agreement arts. 65 and 66. 
33. Least developed countries are given still longer transition periods. See TRIPs 
Agreement art. 65. 
34. The United Nations classification tables are likely to be defIDing. See UNCTAD, 
The Least Developed Countries: 1993-1994 Report X (1994). Singapore, one of Asia's 
four tigers, prefers to reap the benefits of being classified as developing but the United 
States and Europe now recognize it as developed because of its substantial gross 
national product and recent economic growth. See Yamaguchi, Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325, 326 (1989). 
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signatory, is obligated by the ASEAN Framework Agreement to 
comply with the TRIPs Agreement.35 It is considered both a 
developing country and a nation in transition.36 
C. ASEAN FRAMEwoRK AGREEMENT 
The ASEAN Framework Agreement is one of several 
cooperative results of the 1995 Fifth ASEAN Summit?7 This 
binding agreement creates a foundation on which ASEAN 
members can begin to work together toward enhanced 
intellectual property protection and enforcement, and 
compliance with the TRIPs Agreement. The ASEAN 
Framework Agreement emphasizes functional cooperation and 
consultation,38 and offers the possibility of technical assistance 
and specialist development, automation, increased 
harmonization,39 reciprocal recognition of intellectual property 
rights within ASEAN, and an ASEAN patent and trademark 
system.40 
III. SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER 
TECHNOLOGY 
Computer technology innovators, creators, and companies have 
traditionally been restricted to the limits of conventional 
35. ABEAN Framework Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2(4). 
36. Vietnam's membership is unlikely in the near future as its legal system is far 
from compliance with the TRIPs Agreement and other GATT obligations. 
37. ABEAN Framework Agreement, supra note 6. 
3B. Id. preamble and arts. 1(1)(3)(6), 2(3), 3. 
39. Id. arts. 3, 4. 
40. Id. arts. 1(4)(5), 3(2). See also Sompong Sucharitkul, Introductory Note, ABEAN: 
Bangkok Summit Declaration on the Progress of ABEAN Vietnam's Membership, 
Greater Economic Cooperation and Closer Political Cooperation in International Fora 
(Dec. 15, 1995), 35 I.L.M. 1063 (1996). Ultimately, an ASEAN patent and trademark 
system will be created to provide an alternative to country by country registrations by 
establishing centralized filings and registrations with rights governed by one set of 
rules and granted for all ABEAN nations similar to the European Union's community-
wide rights. See David Wilkinson, The Community Trade Mark Regulation and Its Role 
in European Economic Integration, BO TMR 113 (March 1990 - April 1990). See also 
Council Regulation 40/941EEC of December 20, 1993 on the Community Trademark, 
O.J. (L 1111). It is likely that ABEAN intellectual property rights for the near future 
will continue to exist or not exist depending on national laws. 
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copyright, patent, trademark, and related trade secret laws.41 
More recently some domestic laws and a few tre~ties have held 
forth the possibility of sui generis protection. This section 
addresses substantive ASEAN intellectual property laws, 
related TRIPs Agreement requirements, and the implications 
of the TRIPs Agreement on ASEAN domestic laws regarding 
the protection of computer technology. 
A. SOFTWARE 
There is an· international debate over whether software 
programs are most appropriately protected by copyright laws, 
which generally protect original literary, dramatic, musical, 
and artistic works, or by patent laws, which generally protect 
ideas and not so much their expressions. For truly new and 
innovative software ideas, patent protection may best limit how 
fast the ideas can be replicated. For other software ideas, just 
protection of the expression by copyright protection is the 
apparent best path. 
1. ASEAN Laws 
Treatment of software has varied among ASEAN nations. 
Most, like Malaysia42 and Thailand, have offered copyright 
protection of creative software expressions43 but deny patent 
protection.44 For example, Vietnam grants copyright protection 
41. This is not entirely true as technology companies traditionally have also used 
nonintellectual property mechanisms to make it difficult for others to pirate their work. 
For example, computer designers embed logic into the custom ASIC (Application 
Specific Integrated Circuit) so that by the time the ASIC is reverse engineered, it is 
often obsolete or cost ineffective. Another example is the use of copy protection by 
software publishers like Sony. Sony has taken steps to make its Play Station CD-Roms 
difficult to copy. Finally, software writers seldom make their source available. The 
executable code image is typically difficult to understand and use as a starting point for 
further development. 
42. See Blatt; supra note 20 (June 19, 1996). See also Malaysia Copyright Act §3 
(1987). 
43. For example, Thailand excludes from "copyrightable" works ideas, procedures, 
processes, systems, methods, concepts, principles, discoveries, or scientific or 
mathematical theories. See Thai Copyright Act, B.E. 2537 (1994) !hereinafter Thai 
Copyright Act). 
44. For example, Thai Patents Act, B.E. 2522 (1979 as amended by Patent Act (No. 
2) 2535, (1992), art. 9 [hereinafter Thai Patents ActJ. Ministry Regulations do provide 
for patentability of certain combinations involving software primarily tied to hardware. 
9
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for software45 and grants patents only for software coupled with 
hardware.46 Those who offer software copyright protection 
typically lack work-for-hire exceptions,47 recognize moral 
rights,48 and may define reproductions49 and rentals for profit 
as infringing.50 At least Myanmar offers no or unclear 
protection.51 
Like other developing nations, most ASEAN nations have a 
number of copyright exclusions.52 Educational and research 
uses,53 adaptations of software necessary for domestic uses,54 
personal uses of pirated software, and good faith violations 
may be defined as noninfringing.55 Foreign software not 
domestically published within thirty days from first 
publications may be copyright excluded56 or subject to 
compulsory licenses if not translated for domestic use.57 
Copyright protection for at least Berne members arises 
45. Civil Code of Vietnam part 6, ch. I, art. 747(1)(n)(1995). See also Vietnam Decree 
No. 20llHDBT regulating the rights of authors (Nov. 14, 1986). 
46. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21,1996). See also Civil Code of Vietnam, part 6, 
ch. II. 
47. For example, Thai law recognizes that employees, absent written contracts to 
the contrary, retain copyrights for their creations. See Thai Copyright Act, supra note 
43, arts. 9,10 and 14. See also Mark Radcliffe, 12 Legal Issues in New Media 
Technologies, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, at 5-6 (Dec. 1995). 
48. For example, Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, art. 18. See also Radcliffe, 
supra note 47, at 14-15. Moral rights involve the right of attribution. Creators, even 
after complete assignments, retain some ongoing legal control over their works 
regarding adaptations, abridgements, damages to reputations, and prestige. 
49. Single personal back-up copies do not infringe. See, e.g., Civil Code of Vietnam, 
part 6, ch. II, art. 761(1)(a)(1995). 
50. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, arts. 30 and 31. 
51. See John F. Pierce, Doing Business in Myanmar, AsIA LAw SUPP. 28 (Oct. 1996). 
See also James Finch & Usausge Phone Myint, Myanmar Moves Forward, but IP Lags 
Behind, AsIA LAw 20-21 (Aug. 1997). 
52. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21 and 29, 1996). See also, e.g., Thai Copyright 
Act, supra note 43, arts. 30, 31, 32 and 35. 
53. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, arts. 7 and 32. See also Blatt, supra 
note 20 (June 29, 1996) 
54. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, art. 35. 
55. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, art. 30. Good faith excludes acts by 
those with actual or constructive knowledge they are infringing. See id. art. 31. See also 
the Copyright Act 1987, Ch. 63 of the Statute of the Republic of Singapore §35-53 
(1987). 
56. For example, Malaysia and Indonesia have these restrictions. 
57. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, arts. 54 and 55. Compulsory 
licenses involve the use of intellectual property rights without authorization by 
governments or third parties authorized by governments on payment of statutory fees. 
10
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automatically,58 extends for fifty years plus creators' lives,59 
and recognizes reciprocal rights for foreign member authors.60 
2. The TRIPs Agreement 
All GATT signatories must protect software (whether in source 
or object code) and databases, to the extent they are 
"intellectual creations," as copywritten literary works under 
certain Berne Convention provisions for minimum terms of 
creators' lives plus fifty years.61 Moral rights are allowed62 and . 
the Berne provisions that permit educational and research 
exceptions from copyright protection appear to continue in 
force.63 Software rentals are precluded except if legitimate 
copies and economic rights of authors are protected,64 and 
nations which presently offer software patent protection may 
continue to do so in conjunction with software copyright 
protection. 
58. At least Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore are members and Vietnam has 
drafted a copyright law which appears to anticipate its membership. See Berne 
Convention, supra note 27. See also U.S. Department of Commerce, Intellectual 
Property Rights in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Flash Fax Information Series, 
Document No. PACRIM9947IVBIS3007, 5 (May 25, 1994) !hereinafter IP Rights in 
Vietnam]. Registration is not required but can help preserve and protect rights after 
the fact. 
59. For example, Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, art. 19. 
60. Berne Convention, supra note 27. 
61. The TRIPs Agreement requires software protection under the Berne Convention, 
supra note 27, arts. 1-21 and the 1971 Appendix. See TRIPs Agreement, arts. 9, 10, 
IOU) and 12. Berne rights include rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute, publicly 
perform, and publicly display. 
62. TRIPs Agreement art. 10. See also Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, art. 18. 
These provisions give creators ongoing control regarding adaptations, abridgements, 
damages to reputation, and prestige. 
63. Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Properly in the Global Marketplace: Impact of 
TRIPS Dispute Settlements?, 29 INT'L LAw. 373 (Summer 1995). 
64. TRIPs Agreement art. 11. It is difficult to envision legitimate personal computer 
software rental situations because software is easily misappropriated by home 
installation followed by return of disks to rental agents. In contrast, corporations need 
ongoing support and may be less likely to misappropriate. They may legitimately 
benefit from rentals or licenses, especially when needs are short term or software is 
rapidly changing. 
11
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3. Implications 
The TRIPs Agreement has significant ramifications for both 
ASEAN Berne nonmembers65 and members. Nonmembers are 
now obligated by the TRIPs Agreement and the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement to come into compliance with Berne, 
and members are now explicitly required to extend copyright 
protection to software. This follows the consensus of Japan, 
Europe, and the United States66 and helps ensure that hard-
fought battles regarding national treatment and minimum 
standards need not be fought again.67 The TRIPs Agreement 
also effectively restricts ASEAN members from permitting 
software rentals, and in some nations both patent and 
copyright protection will be possible. 
Certain problems remain unresolved. Though the TRIPs 
Agreement copyright protection should impede wholesale 
duplication of computer software and codes,68 it appears to do 
little to prevent production of similar or functionally equivalent 
variations by third parties, particularly unprotectable 
functional components of software like databases.69 The TRIPs 
Agreement also permits moral rights, with resulting 
implications for ASEAN software licensing.7o Finally, the 
TRIPs Agreement fails to address or effectively limit certain 
65. Blatt, supra note 20 (June 18, 1996). 
66. Michael Lehmann, Symposium: Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm: 
Comments: TRIPs, the BERNE Convention, and Legal Hybrids, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
2622. 
67. While copyright protection of software continues to be controversial, the TRIPs 
Agreement's choice of copyright versus patent protection of software is probably the 
better choice because it preserves competition versus temporary monopolies and avoids 
the more significant international differences in patent laws. Bronckers, supra note 24, 
at 1262-1263. See also Lehmann, supra note 66, at 2625-2626. Protection is especially 
significant because advances in technology are making copyright infringement much 
easier and less expensive. See Michael L. Doane, TRIPs and International Intellectual 
Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 465 
(Winter 1994). 
68. Geller, supra note 63, at 372. 
69. ASEAN members, like the United States, may refuse copyright protection and 
claim the "intellectual creations" standard has not been met. See Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991). Functional components have also 
been ineligible for classical trade secret protection. See Geller, supra note 63, at 372-
373. 
70. Blatt, supra note 20 (June 29, 1996). 
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ASEAN copyright exclusions, which suggests that the negative 
economic effects of these exclusions will continue. 
B. HARDwARE 
Hardware includes circuit boards, electronic components, disk 
drives, and physical apparatus in data processing or computer 
assemblies. 
1. ASEAN Laws 
Where hardware patent protection is available, ASEAN nations 
generally confer patent rights on new, useful, and nonobvious 
processes and products.71 Co-inventing is recognized72 and 
patent rights are acquired on a first to file basis,73 with varying 
but typically short patent terms74 calculated from filing dates. 
Preconditions to patent grants include requirements that 
patent applications be sufficiently self-contained to permit 
others with appropriate skills to carry out the inventions75 and 
most require absolute novelty,76 with patents being unavailable 
to those who make public disclosures or utilizations prior to 
first filings. 77 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam belong to the Paris 
Convention,78 which grants important rights of priority 
regarding patent applications arising from signatory states. 
Other ASEAN nations like Thailand grant rights of bilateral 
71. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, arts. 5 and 36, and IP Rights in 
Vietnam, supra note 58; Malaysian Patents Act §ll (1983). 
72. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 15. 
73. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, arts. 6(2) and 16. 
74. See John G. Byrne, Changes on the Frontier of Intellectual Property Law: An 
Overview of the Changes Required by GAT!', 34 DUQUESNE L. REV. 92 (1995) 
(testimony of Ira S. Shapiro, General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative). 
75. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 19. The TRIPs Agreement article 
29 permits members to require applicant disclosure of the best mode for carrying out 
the invention. 
76. E.g. Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 29, 996). 
77. There are a few exceptions to the absolute novelty requirement. For example, 
Thailand excepts disclosures under trade secret agreements, for testing purposes, and 
at official exhibits. See Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, arts. 6(2), 6 and 19. See also 
Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996). 
78. Paris Convention, supra note 27. 
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reciprocity.79 Applicants filing in joint Paris Convention or 
reciprocal nations within twelve months of original filings 
receive the benefit of the original filings for purposes of 
determining patent registrability.80 ASEAN nations granting 
only reciprocityBl give competing computer technology different 
values depending upon their countries of origin.82 
Most ASEAN nations require publication of patent 
applications83 and, like other developing countries, have a 
number of exclusions from patentable subject matter and 
patent exclusivity. Exclusions may include inventions contrary 
to the vague socialist morality, utilizations for non-commercial 
purposes, grey market circulations, educational uses, and good 
faith infringements.84 Compulsory licensing provisions are also 
common.85 
2. The TRIPs Agreement 
All GATT signatories are required to follow the Paris 
Convention86 and provide patent protection for hardware 
products and processes87 which are new, capable of industrial 
application, and involve inventive stepS.88 The TRIPs 
Agreement further requires terms of no less than twenty years 
from filingB9 and provisional application procedures whereby 
applicants may establish the earliest possible dates of 
inventions, defer examinations, file "continuations in part" to 
79. Thai Patent Act, supra note 44, art. 19. 
80. For example, Thai Patent Act, supra note 44, arts. 20 and 6(2). Neither the Paris 
Convention nor reciprocal rights modifY domestic ABEAN laws. See note 77. 
81. See, e.g., Thai Patent Act, supra note 44, arts. 14 and 19bis. Reciprocity protects 
others' innovations to the extent there is reciprocal national treatment. 
82. Geller, supra note 63, at 101. 
83. Blatt, supra note 20. 
84. See, e.g., IP Rights in Vietnam, supra note 58, at 2-3; Thai Patent Act, supra 
note 44, art. 36. Grey market uses may be excluded or, as with Vietnam, dermed as 
noninfringing. Vietnam Civil Code, part II, art. 803. 
85. Compulsory licenses involve government authorized uses by third parties. See, 
e.g., Civil Code of Vietnam ch. II, art. 802. 
86. Supra note 27. 
87. TRIPs Agreement arts. 27(1) and 28(1). 
88. TRIPs Agreement arts. 25(1) and 27. 
89. TRIPs Agreement art. 33. 
14
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 4 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol4/iss1/4
32 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 4:1 
incorporate new matters, and benefit from priority filing dates 
of earlier provisional applications.90 
Protection must be without regard to where products are 
invented, produced, or implemented, provided that these acts 
occur within WTO nations,91 and all patent applications must 
be published within eighteen months of filings. Exceptions to 
patent exclusivity are permitted but must not unreasonably 
conflict with or prejudice rightholders, taking into account the 
rights of third parties.92 There are fifteen comp~lsory licensing 
prerequisites.93 
3. Implications 
The TRIPs Agreement represents a significant step toward 
establishing ASEAN and international patent hardware 
standards by addressing problems common to the patent 
systems of many developing nations. The TRIPs Agreement 
reduces local working requirements, limits patent exclusions,94 
increases and standardizes typical ASEAN patent terms,95 and 
resolves ASEAN's differing hardware treatment depending on 
the country of origin by requiring signatories to follow the 
Paris Convention.96 It also resolves the more and more frequent 
problems of localizing the origins of creations97 and the 
territories of infringements.98 While rightholders should find 
reassuring the TRIPs Agreement's lessening of the pressure to 
"work" patents, some of the TRIPs Agreement restrictions are 
90. Paris Convention rights of priority are calculated from provisional application 
filing dates. 
91. TRIPs Agreement art. 27. 
92. TRIPs Agreement art. 30. 
93. TRIPs Agreement art. 31. 
94. See Doane, supra note 67. 
95. This should please multinational companies investing in or doing business with 
ASEAN. Contrast Thailand's patent term of 20 years from filing which already 
complies with the TRIPs Agreement. See, Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 35. 
96. See supra notes 78 to 84 and 86 and accompanying text. 
97. Technology is increasingly developed by simultaneous collaboration in many 
countries. Countries limiting protection to mutual reciprocity have had to localize 
innovations to one country, sometimes deny protection or create legal fictions. Geller, 
supra note 63, at 101-102. 
98. [d. 
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still vague and easily subjectable to abuse,99 and domestic 
exceptions to patentability are inadequately addressed.lOo 
Many ASEAN nations already require publication;lol the TRIPs 
Agreement reinforces this. Mandatory publication reduces the 
problem of submarine patentsl02 but forces inventors to choose 
between seeking trade secret protection or seeking patent 
protection with the risk of patent rejection and mandatory 
publication which negates trade secret status.103 The TRIPs 
Agreement, like all ASEAN patent laws, protects those first to 
file. 
C. INTEGRATED CIRCUITS 
The past twenty years have seen a rapid change in integrated 
circuits, related mask works, semiconductor chips, and certain 
new technologieslO4 which do not conveniently fit mto 
traditional forms of intellectual property protection. As a 
consequence, traditional protection has proven inadequate and 
incorporation of new technologies into domestic laws and the 
Paris-Berne regime has lagged behind.lo5 
99. For example, the TRIPs Agreement prohibits patent interferences which 
"unreasonably conflict." See TRIPs Agreement art. 30. 
100. For example, the TRIPs Agreement leaves unresolved issues like whether 
Thailand may permit good faith infringements. See note 55. 
101. For example, Thailand. See Blatt, supra note 15, at 6. 
102. Submarine patents are those which are continued without disclosure for a 
period prior to grant, surfacing only when subsequent applicants independently invent 
the same technology after frequently having spent valuable time and effort developing 
products only to discover than the earlier applicants have become the valid patent 
holders as prior inventors. See Blatt, supra note 20. 
103. This decision is further complicated by the fact that civil law ASEAN members 
do not typically offer trade secret protection though the TRIPs Agreement requires 
them to do so by year 2000. See TRIPs Agreement art. 39(2) and see Giunta & Shang, 
supra note 13, at 344. See also Blatt, supra note 15, at 6. 
104. See Doane, supra note 67, at 469. See also Aerospace: Future of Defense, N.P.R. 
radio broadcast (May 28, 1992). 
105. Most semiconductor products are said to lack the sufficient inventiveness 
required by patent law and are barred from copyright law because they are essentially 
utilitarian. Doane, supra note 67, at 488. 
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1. ASEAN Laws 
Semiconductor chip protection by ASEAN nations is unclear, 
but it is likely some have extended intellectual property rights 
to semiconductor chips while others have failed to grant rights 
or resolve gaps in protection. The Treaty on Intellectual 
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (Washington IIPIC 
Treaty) offers semiconductor protection but fails to cover 
articles incorporating integrated circuits and to prohibit 
compulsory licensing. It extends protection for only eight years. 
Developing countries have strongly opposed it.loo 
2. The TRIPs Agreement 
The TRIPs Agreement remedies some serious gaps in domestic 
and Paris-Berne protection by· following the Japanese and 
United States sui generis solution to semiconductor chip 
protection. 107 It requires signatories to protect unpatented 
functional designs of integrated circuits/OS semi-conductors,l09 
and articles incorporating integrated circuits for a minimum of 
ten years, subject to a good faith exception,110 and to follow the 
WashingtonlIPIC Treaty.11l Minimum protection is extended to 
ten years.ll2 Rights of priority and compulsory licensing 
restrictions are identical to those for hardwareya 
106. See Third World Questions the Need for Integrated Circuit Treaty, 34 PAT. 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 59-60 (May 21, 1987). See also WashingtonlIPIC 
Treaty, supra note 28 and Michael Kirk, TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in the 
Pacific Rim Countries, Address at CLE International Seminar 10 (March 17,1994). 
107. The United States leads the way with the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 
of 1984, 17 U.S.C. sections 901-914 (Supp. II 1984). This act includes a reciprocity 
clause which requires other nations, to receive the benefits of the act, to grant the same 
or similar protection. Japan and then the WashingtonlIPIC Treaty followed. See Doane, 
supra note 67. 
108. Also known as "mask works", "lay-out designs", and "semiconductor chip 
topographies". See the TRIPs Agreement part I, section 6, arts. 35-38. 
109. TRIPs Agreement art. 36. 
110. TRIPs Agreement arts. 36-38. 
111. TRIPs Agreement arts. 35-38. See also WashingtonlIPIC Treaty, supra note 
28. Members must not permit commercial importing, selling or distributing of the 
protected items. TRIPs Agreement art. 36. 
112. TRIPs Agreement arts. 35-38. 
113. See TRIPs Agreement arts. 38 and 37(2). See also supra notes 84-91 and 
accompanying text. 
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3. Implications 
It seems no one likes the TRIPs Agreement integrated circuit 
requirements. One problem is that the TRIPs Agreement is an 
improvised or partial patch of the Paris-Berne regime1l4 and 
the United States and Japan, by far the world's largest 
producers of semiconductor chips, object to the 
WashingtonlIPIC Treaty's failure to compensate for innocent 
infringement.l15 Whether the TRIPs Agreement resolves some 
of these concerns, it fails to address good faith infringement. 
Still others question the need for integrated circuit 
prptection.1l6 Perhaps half a loaf is better than none. ASEAN 
and American semiconductor industries should overall benefit 
from the TRIPs Agreement explicit sui generis protection. 
D. FuTuRE TECHNOLOGY AND HYBRIDS 
In this age of rapid technological advances, hybrids are 
becoming increasingly important. Though in most cases 
computer technology is readily identifiable as hardware or 
software, hybrid situations exist. For example, user interfaces 
are hybrids of hardware and software, as are certain software 
programs that are closely coupled with computer hardware 
circuits and modern microprocessors using micro-code.l17 
1. ASEAN Laws 
Hybrids have posed difficulties for ASEAN nations and non-
ASEAN nations alike. Laws have typically been static and 
rigid, and also vulnerable to becoming outmoded and useless. 
114. See Geller, supra note 63, at 103. 
115. Presumably concerns regarding remedies and dispute resolution are in part 
resolved by the TRIPs Agreement's enforcement provisions and the new WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding COSU)'s conflicting and superseding provisions. See U.S., 
Japan Refuse to Sign Treaty to Protect Integrated Circuits, 3 WORLD INTELL. PRoP. 
REP. 156 (1989). See also infra Part IV regarding the TRIPs Agreement enforcement 
and the DSU and Kirk, supra note 106. 
116. A computer engineer expressed to this author his view that chips that are 
truly new and innovative are patentable and other chips are getting so complicated and 
large in capacity, it is questionable how much protection is needed. Furthermore, by 
the time chips are reverse engineered, the technology has moved on, in the present 
climate. 
117. Blatt, supra note 15, at 5. 
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For example, the problem of software closely tied to hardware 
has been resolved by some by extending patent protection.us 
Others may provide no or uncertain protection. The issue has 
been one of patent versus copyright protection and where the 
line is between ideas and expressions of ideas. Past conventions 
have neither addressed hybrids nor provided flexible 
mechanisms for addressing changes in technology. 
2. The TRIPs Agreement 
The TRIPs Agreement provides an ongoing fluid mechanism for 
the adjustment and expansion of international intellectual 
property law to meet new computer technologies. It creates the 
TRIPs Council and authorizes it to undertake biannual reviews 
of current protection and new developments which may 
warrant modifications or amendments to the TRIPs 
Agreement.1l9 Regarding software coupled with hardware, the 
TRIPs Agreement ensures at least copyright protection.120 
3. Implications 
Unlike previous conventions, the TRIPs Agreement makes a 
general statement of authority to negotiate for changes in 
current forms and new sui generis forms of protection. By 
providing a flexible international mechanism, the TRIPs 
Agreement helps ensure that ASEAN, regional, and global 
intellectual 'property systems will evolve with computer 
technology. Though the impact of these provisions for new 
technology and emerging hybrids on ASEAN intellectual 
property laws is unclear, the TRIPs Agreement ensures that at 
least the hybrid of software tightly coupled with hardware will 
receive copyright protection.121 
118. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 9. Vietnam also allows for the 
possibility of patent protection. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996). See also Civil 
Code of Vietnam part 6, ch. II. 
119. TRIPs Agreement art. 71. 
120. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
121. [d. 
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E. TRAD~ SECRETS 
Trade secret protection is related to intellectual property 
protection. Trade secrets extend beyond ideas protectible by 
patent law to secret concepts or ideas of value to the owners of 
the secrets. Confidential information may represent crucial 
business assets, though often it is nonregistrable. 
1. ASEAN Laws 
Not all ASEAN jurisdictions presently have legal mechanisms 
by which confidential information related to computer 
technology can be protected. In general, ASEAN common law 
systems like those of Singapore and Malaysia protect trade 
secrets and fiduciary obligations if information is of competitive 
value, is confidential, and the owners have taken affirmative 
steps to keep the secrets.122 In contrast, ASEAN civil law 
systems like Thailand and Vietnam typically afford no trade 
secret protection or, when they do, protection is by statute with 
gaps that case law does not fill well. l23 For example, Thailand's 
new trade secret law will not be implemented for five to ten 
years. During the interim Thailand lacks a good mechanism for 
penalizing wrongful disclosure of confidential information,l24 
though it will to some degree recognize trade secret protection 
which arises as a matter ofcontract.l25 
2. The TRIPs Agreement 
All GATT signatories are required to protect "undisclosed 
information" with commercial value, not in the public domain, 
and subject to "reasonable steps under the circumstances" to 
122. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996). See also Singapore, Intellectual 
Property Protection in Asia Issue 4, 8-58 (Arthur Wineburg, ed. 1995). 
123. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 18, 1996). 
124. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 29, 1996). See also Christopher Moore, 
Thailand .- Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreements under Thai Law, WORLD 
REPORTS, Item 1289, 74 (Oct.-Dec. 1993). 
125. See Christopher Moore, Thailand -- Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure 
Agreements under Thai Law, WORLD REPORTS, Item 1289, 74 (Oct.-Dec. 1993). 
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maintain confidentiality . from unconsented disclosure, 
acquisition, or use contrary to "honest commercial practices."126 
Breaches of contract, breaches of confidence, inducements to 
breach, and acquisitions of undisclosed information through 
third parties with constructive knowledge are prohibited.127 
Self-help methods of reverse engineering are not expressly 
banned.128 
3. Implications 
The TRIPs Agreement is the first international convention to 
expressly require protection of undisclosed information and it 
should lead to increases in ASEAN trade secret protection of 
computer technology. For some members trade secret 
protection will be new. For others, like Thailand, which 
presently enforce contractual confidentiality agreements but 
lack codified systems of trade secret protection, the TRIPs 
Agreement mandated formal system should provide the most 
effective means of protecting trade secrets.l29 As most high 
technology is not in the form of patents but proprietary 
information,t30 the TRIPs Agreement's trade secret protection 
should stimulate computer technology companies to license 
advanced technologies more frequently to ASEAN nations131 
and to choose trade secret protection as an alternative to 
patent protection. Reverse engineering continues to be lawful 
in at least all ASEAN common law countries and this may not 
be a bad thing.132 Perhaps the effectiveness of the TRIPs 
126. TRIPs Agreement art. 39(2). See also TRIPs Agreement part I, section 7. 
127. TRIPs Agreement art. 39, note 10. 
128. TRIPs Agreement art. 39(2), note 10. 
129. See Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 342. 
130. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996). 
131. See Geller, supra note 63, at 379. See also TRIPs Agreement part I, art. 7. One 
high level computer engineer remarked to this author, "If IP trade secrets are not 
honored, (ASEAN) countries will be at a competitive disadvantage. There is no way 
(my corporation) would even consider working with a company that did not have to 
honor our non-discIosure agreements and trade secrets." 
132. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996). Reverse engineering is part of the 
high tech world and every company may do it. Provided trade secrecy agreements and 
other ethical considerations are not violated, this may be acceptable. 
21
Wilson: TRIPS Agreement Implications
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
1997] TRIPS AGREEMENT IMPLICATIONS 39 
Agreement's trade secrets protection will be limited by the need 
for plaintiffs in national courts to prove that those who 
allegedly misappropriated trade secrets acted "contrary to 
honest commercial practices".133 
F. TRADEMARKS 
Trademarks (marks) are valuable business assets that 
advertise, distinguish, and identify the unique commercial 
identities of computer technology products and corporate 
names. l34 For example, Apple Computers uses an apple to 
identify the source and value of its products. 
1. ASEAN Laws 
Words, names, phrases, symbols, and logos which are capable 
of distinguishing goods or services of one undertaking from 
those of other undertakings are capable of constituting 
trademarks in ASEAN and most nations of the world. ABEAN 
civil law marks are acquired by being the first to filel35 and 
ASEAN common law marks are acquired by use.136 Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Vietnam belong to the Paris Convention which 
grants important rights of priority regarding trademark 
applications arising from joint signatory states.137 Other 
ASEAN nations like Thailand grant reciprocity. As with 
patents and sui generis protection, those making additional 
filings in joint Paris Conventionl38 or reciprocal nations within 
six months of original filings receive the benefit of the original 
filing dates for purposes of determining registrability of 
133. See Preston Gates and Ellis, Mary Williamson, Kim Newby, Intellectual 
Property Issues, AsIA LAw SuPP. 6 (Oct. 1996). 
134. RICHARD BERNACCHI, ANDRE BRUNEL & GARY N. FRISCHLING, A GENERAL 
PRIMER ON TRADEMARKS 1 (1993-1994). 
135. ASEAN nations protect without regard to who first created the trademarks, 
unlike the United States. See, e.g., Thai Trademarks Act, B.E. 2534 art. 4 (AD. 1991) 
[hereinafter Thai Trademarks ActJ. 
136. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996). Registration is still advisable to help 
preserve and enforce trademark rights. 
137. They receive the benefit of original filing dates for purposes of determining 
registrability of trademarks. See TRIPs Agreement art. 16. See also supra notes 78-82. 
138. For example, Thai Trademarks Act, supra note 135, art. 20. Neither the Paris 
Convention nor reciprocal rights modify domestic ASEAN laws. 
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trademarks. l39 As neither the Paris Convention nor reciprocal 
rights modify domestic laws, trademark terms and 
renewability vary.l40 Infringement is defined by ASEAN 
nations, and worldwide, as third party misuse of same or 
confusingly similar marks.14l 
2. The TRIPs Agreement 
Registrable subject matter includes that allowed by present 
ASEAN laws. The TRIPs Agreement also requires express 
protection of color combinations, combinations of signs, and 
marks which lack inherent meanings but have acquired 
distinctiveness through use.142 Signatories may require 
subsequent use, but may not require use as prerequisites to 
registration. 143 Registrations may be refused and marks 
invalidated if they are contrary to morality or public order, 
deceptive, involve unfair competition, are not published before 
registration or promptly thereafter/44 or for other grounds 
which do not derogate from the Paris Convention.l45 
Registrations must be effective for unlimited renewable terms 
of at least seven years146 and declarations of use must be filed if 
uses are required to maintain registrations.l47 
Protection must be exclusive and extend to marks used by 
unauthorized third parties on dissimilar goods or services if 
confusion is likely with owners' registered marks.l48 
Markholders are still subject to limitations imposed by national 
laws, though the legitimate interests of trademark owners and 
139. See, e.g., Thai Trademarks Act, supra note 135, art. 28. See also Geller, supra 
note 63, at 101, and supra notes 81 and 82. 
140. For example, Vietnam allows for ten year terms with single ten year 
extensions. See IP Rights in Vietnam, supra note 58, at 5. See also Vietnam Decree No. 
2411CP (regarding the extended time limit with respect to trademark registration) 
(June 30, 1992). 
141. See Thai Trademarks Act, supra note 135, arts. 20-27. 
142. TRIPs Agreement art. 15(1). 
143. TRIPs Agreement art. 15(3). 
144. TRIPs Agreement art. 15(5). See also supra note 79. 
145. TRIPs Agreement art. 15(2). 
146. TRIPs Agreement art. 18. 
147. TRIPs Agreement art. 19. 
148. TRIPs Agreement art. 16(1). 
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third parties must be considered.149 Permitted restrictions 
include conditions on licensings and assignments, allowances 
for fair uses, and invalidations for three years of uninterrupted 
failures to use. 150 Compulsory licenses are no longer 
permitted.151 
3. Implications 
The TRIPs Agreement has few implications for ASEAN 
trademark protection of computer technology, as trademark 
law is already fairly well harmonized among ASEAN members 
and elsewhere in the world.152 While the TRIPs Agreement does 
not require significant changes in ASEAN substantive mark 
protection, it makes clear that unauthorized third party uses of 
confusingly similar marks on unrelated goods and servicesl53 
and of widely known marks are infringements. ASEAN 
computer technology manufacturers and retailers may also 
benefit from recent ASEAN efforts which exceed the TRIPs 
Agreement's present requirements. Soon trademark 
registrations will result in automatic recognition by other 
ASEAN nations. l54 The ASEAN Framework Agreement 
suggests at least the possibility of a future ASEAN trademark 
system.l55 
G. LIMITATIONS ON RIGHTS 
Intellectual property rights are sometimes granted for 
computer technology but then restricted by domestic 
intellectual property and other laws, and technology transfer 
restrictions. These limits may cause rights to be revoked or 
149. TRIPs Agreement art. 17. Special requirements which cause unjustifiable 
encumbrances are prohibited. See TRIPs Agreement art. 20. 
150. TRIPs Agreement art. 19. Circumstances beyond markholders' control are an 
exception to the compulsory use requirement. These include import restrictions on the 
goods in question or other governmental requirements which impede use. 
151. TRIPs Agreement art. 21. 
152. For example, most of the world uses the likelihood of confusion test to 
determine infringement. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 18 and 21, 1996). 
153. This provision should reduce ASEAN misappropriation of trademarks and is a 
change from some ASEAN laws. See, e.g., Civil Code of Vietnam, part 6, art. 785. 
154. Statement of Professor Sompong Sucharitkul, First ASEAN Secretariat 
General, to author (June 18, 1996). 
155. ASEAN Framework Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 1(4)(5) and 3(2). 
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restrict licensings and assignments of intellectual property 
rights. 
1. ASEAN Laws 
Different devices are used to restrict ASEAN intellectual 
property grants. Vague public health, morality, and welfare 
limitations give ultimate power to governments to deny rights. 
ASEAN members, like other developing nations, also provide 
for compulsory licenses. For example, mandatory patent 
licenses may be granted for failures of right holders to engage in 
local production,156 certain educational and research 
purposes/57 and to improve earlier patents.l58 Certain domestic 
prerequisites will apply.159 
Vague and subjective ASEAN anti-competition laws interfere if 
intellectual property rights may unduly limit competition, and 
poorly developed ASEAN technology transfer restrictions will 
create obstacles particularly if proposed transfers are not likely 
to result in enhanced domestic economic output.1SO Varying 
restrictions on licensing further limit intellectual property 
rights. 161 Licenses which involve unfair competition,162 lack 
156. This is thought compatible with the Paris Convention which permits 
compulsory licenses for "nonworking" of patents. See Paris Convention, supra note 27, 
art. 5A(2). After the requisite period of time has passed, nonexclusive compulsory 
licenses are granted. See also Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, arts. 46 and 46bis, 
Singaporean Patents Act §55(2)(a); and Hadiputranto, Hadinoto & Partners, IndtJnesia 
Revamps IP Laws, AsIA LAw 70 (June/July 1997). 
157. See Geller, supra note 63, at 372. See also supra notes 53-57 and 
accompanying text. 
158. This type of compulsory license is not expressly permitted by the Paris and 
Berne Conventions. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 47 and Civil Code of 
Vietnam ch. II, art. 802(1)(3). 
159. For example, Thai law requires that patent compulsory licenses be necessary, 
nonassignable, nonexclusive, aimed primarily at meeting domestic demand, and 
include adequate or reasonable compensation. See Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, 
arts. 48 and 52. See also Civil Code of Vietnam ch. II, art. 802(2) 
160. See Blatt, supra note 20 (July 2, 1996). See also, e.g., Civil Code of Vietnam 
ch. III, arts. 808(a) and 809(1). 
161. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 38. 
162. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 38 and Thai Copyright Act. 
supra note 43, arts. 15 and 16. The undefmed "unfair competition" is presumably 
defmed by the Director General and is potentially problematic. See also Blatt, supra 
note 20. 
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unanimous co-inventor agreement/53 fail to be government 
registered, or do not comply with other technology transfer 
restrictions may be denied. l64 Theories similar to the European 
exhaustion of rights doctrine may serve to further impede 
licensing. l65 Finally, limits on ASEAN intellectual property 
rights are reinforced by the ASEAN Framework Agreement's 
recognition that restraints on trade and adverse transfers of 
technology should be avoided.l66 
2. The TRIPs Agreement 
Signatories may act under domestic antitrust and 
anticompetition legislation against excessive price charging, 
unreasonable restraints on trade, and licensing conditions 
which adversely affect international transfers of knowledge.167 
Certain patent exclusionsl68 and licensing conditions are 
permissible. 169 Exhaustion of rights is not addressed but 
presumably this and similar restrictions may continue.170 
Hardware and integrated circuit compulsory licenses now must 
comply with twelve requirements, including uses restricted 
primarily to domestic markets, failed prior attempts to 
negotiate with right holders, non-exclusivity, and payment of 
adequate royalties. l7l Exploitation of dependent patents is now 
163. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, arts. 38 and 40. 
164. See, e.g., Vietnam Decree No. 20llHDBT (promulgating the Ordinance on 
License Contracts) (Dec. 28, 1988). See also IP Rights in Vietnam, supra note 58, at 6; 
Blatt, supra note 20, (July 2, 1996). 
165. European Union courts and directives have ruled that intellectual property 
owners cannot prevent grey market sales (unauthorized sales of goods or services by 
contractual licensees and distributees) because their rights have been "exhausted". See, 
e.g., Centrafarm B. V. and Adriaan de Peijper v. Winthrop B. V., Case 16n4, E.C.R. 1183 
(1974). See also First Council Directive 89/104lEEC of December 21, 1988 to 
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 32 O.J. (L 40) 
(1989), art. 7. See also Blatt, supra note 20 (July 4, 1996). 
166. ASEAN Framework Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2(5). 
167. TRIPs Agreement arts. 8 and 40. 
168. For example, nations may restrict patents to protect public morality. See 
TRIPs Agreement art. 27(2). 
169. For example, governments may prohibit "no challenge" clauses. See TRIPs 
Agreement art. 40. 
170. See supra note 165. Japan, while not following the exhaustion of rights 
doctrine, uses. an anticompetition theory to classifY unauthorized sales and 
distributions of grey market goods as noninfringing. 
171. TRIPs Agreement arts. 31, 37(2) and 38. 
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limited172 and licenses for failure to "work" patents are now 
prohibited.173 Software compulsory licenses are permitted for 
certain educational and research purposes174 but trademark 
compulsory licenses are prohibited.175 
3. Implications 
The TRIPs Agreement fails to effectively restrict ASEAN 
intellectual property abuses in several ways. It allows many 
discretionary and vague ASEAN anti-competition, technology 
transfer, and other restrictions to remain,176 and makes it 
difficult to plan technology transfers with the needed 
certainty.177 The TRIPs Agreement' broad and abusable 
exclusions from patentable and sui generis subject matter, and 
resulting inadequate "pipeline protection" of hardware and 
integrated circuits, may continue to dampen development of 
computer technology. Finally, compulsory licenses have been 
historically abused by developing countries. It, appears ASEAN 
software abuses may continue, though the TRIPs Agreement 
should effectively reduce arbitrary and unfair compulsory 
licenses of hardware and integrated circuits.178 
IV. PROCEDURAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER 
TECHNOLOGY 
The increase in value of intellectual property has raised the 
level of concern regarding the adequacy of enforcement and 
172. Dependent patents involve improvements on dominant, or underlying patents. 
The TRIPs Agreement art. 31(e). 
173. TRIPs Agreement arts. 27 and 31. 
174. See Geller, supra note 63. 
175. TRIPs Agreement art. 21. 
176. See Bronckers, supra note 24, at 1270. See also Blatt, supra note 20 (July 2, 
1996). 
177. See Blatt, supra note 20 (July 2, 1996). 
178. For example, the TRIPs Agreement's requirement of adequate payment 
reduces the likelihood of de facto expropriations of patents and sui generls rights. 
Compulsory license abuses may be exaggerated as the consensus nature of ASEAN 
people typically results in parties agreeing to licensing terms without governmental 
assistance. See Blatt, supra note 20 (July 2, 1996). 
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remedies for infringement.179 Intellectual property rights may 
be worthless without· adequate enforcement. 
A. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
Foreign rightholders seek to enforce ASEAN intellectual 
property rights and secure remedies for infringement through 
domestic enforcement mechanisms. 
1. ASEAN Laws 
Rightholders in ASEAN countries have often felt that although 
intellectual property laws exist, in actual practice they provide 
little relief.lso Many ASEAN parties are members of the Berne 
and Paris Conventions, but neither supervises enforcement; 
five ASEAN countries - Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand - have recently been considered by 
at least the United States government to be among Asia's most 
serious intellectual property offenders.lsl There is hope that 
ASEAN enforcement will improve soon. For example, though 
Singapore was identified in 1989 as a frequent copyright 
violator, it is now fairly consistent in its intellectual property 
enforcement.1S2 Thailand has also made notable recent efforts 
to improve and has passed new copyright, patent, and 
trademark laws. Recent Thai legislation also establishes a 
specialized Intellectual Property and International Trade 
Court and expands enforcement.l83 Another example of 
improvement is Indonesia. While its laws lack enforcement, 
particularly regarding software, it has agreed to make diligent 
179. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 19, 1996). 
180. For a discussion of the developing nation gap between substantive intellectual 
property laws and enforcement, see Bronckers, supra note 24, at 1273. See also supra 
notes 58 and 78, and accompanying text. 
181. Dru Brenner-Beck, Do As I Say, Not As I Did, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 84 
(1992). Thailand was cited in 1989, 1991, and 1992 by the United States government 
for severe intellectual property protection deficiencies. See Suwanprateep, supra note 
5, at 35. 
182. See Blatt, supra note 20 (July 2, 1996). 
183. See Suwanprateep, supra note 5, at 31-35 (1994). See also, e.g., Thai Copyright 
Act, supra note 43, arts. 7 and 8. 
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efforts to enhance enforcement and even now is drafting new 
laws toward that end. l84 
2. The TRIPs Agreement 
With present domestic and international treaty limits in mind, 
the TRIPs Agreement devotes unusual detail to enforcement of 
private rights and attempts to create minimum standards in 
terms of harmonization for foreigners seeking relief. All 
signatories must ensure effective, expeditious, equitable, and 
impartial enforcement of substantive TRIPs rights.l85 Civil 
actions and damages, criminal penalties for commercial 
trademark and copyright infringements/86 provisional and 
injunctive relief, seizure and exclusion of infringing imports, 
compulsory court processes, and discovery to force infringers to 
identify suppliers must be afforded.187 Decisions must be on the 
merits and based only on evidence presented/88 be "preferably" 
in writing, reasoned, and available to the parties; and include 
rights of judicial review for certain administrative decisions.189 
the TRIPs Agreement also requires recognition of third party 
liability,t90 legal assistance, and preservation of evidence.l9l 
3. Implications 
Enforcement provisions are the most significant and far-
reaching provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. The TRIPs 
Agreement offers at least the possibility of real ASEAN 
enforcement mechanisms and should reduce domestic political 
pressures that support deficiencies in intellectual property 
enforcement. Two requirements of particular significance are 
the right of appeal, presently lacking in many ASEAN 
184. See note 10, at 10. 
185. TRIPs Agreement art. 41(2). 
186. TRIPs Agreement art. 41. 
187. TRIPs Agreement arts. 42-46 and 59-61. 
188. TRIPs Agreement art. 41(3). 
189. TRIPs Agreement arts. 44-46. 
190. TRIPs Agreement art. 2, note 10. 
191. TRIPs Agreement art. 41(1). 
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intellectual property systems/92 and the critical mandate that 
infringing goods be intercepted and seized.193 
While the TRIPs Agreement makes it more difficult for ASEAN 
nations to give just lip service to intellectual property 
protection, the TRIPs Agreement enforcement provisions have 
several limitations. The TRIPs Agreement does not require 
special resources nor separate legal systems to protect 
intellectual property,t94 and domestic laws prevail where the 
TRIPs Agreement remedies are inconsistent.195 Though judicial 
authorities must be authorized to grant certain remedies, the 
TRIPs Agreement does not mandate their actual use and it is 
unlikely new remedies will be used in jurisdictions to which 
these remedies are foreign.196 
The TRIPs Agreement also does not and can not do much to 
address violations which lack complainants, nor ensure 
independent governmental initiative in wrestling with 
intellectual property violations. ASEAN intellectual property 
holders appear to be still vulnerable to unreasonably slow 
enforcement processes during which illegal activity may 
continue. Finally, though national and most favored nation 
treatment and the promise of technical assistance are part of 
the TRIPs Agreement, these mechanisms will likely prove 
incapable of addressing insidious discrimination against 
foreigners by enforcement officials, inadequate training and 
resources for enforcement, court decisions which are biased 
against foreigners, and judiciaries which are not independent 
of political influence and corrupt practices. 
192. Blatt, supra note 20 (July 3, 1996). 
193. TRIPs Agreement arts. 46 and 51. 
194. TRIPs Agreement art. 41(5). 
195. Declaratory judgments and "adequate compensation" must be available. See 
TRIPs Agreement art. 44(2). 
196. While damages, injunctive relief, and civil and criminal penalties are not 
foreign to at least Thailand, jurisdictions awarding these remedies are likely to 
significantly vary in the use and scope of these remedies. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act, 
supra note 43, arts. 62, 64 and 65. 
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B. INTERGOVERNMENTAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
During the past ten years the value of intellectual property has 
greatly increased, causing intergovernmental intellectual 
property disputes to become a prime trade issue.197 
Intergovernmental disputes arise when foreign intellectual 
property laws and private enforcement fail. Governments then 
look for mechanisms by which to resolve their disputes with 
"offending" nations. 
1. ASEAN Laws 
Past efforts to force ASEAN members to protect effectively 
intellectual property have been largely unsuccessful. One 
problem is that ASEAN's largest trading partners have 
addressed intellectual property disputes by resort to bilateral 
trade-based approaches. The United States has aggressively 
used its controversial Special 301 procedures and sanctions198 
to push trading partners like Thailand to offer higher levels of 
intellectual property protection and better protect United 
States technology.l99 The European Commission has invoked a 
new trade regulation2°O against ASEAN intellectual property 
violators. Both have resorted to cross-retaliation.201 
Another problem in forcing ASEAN members to effectively 
protect intellectual property rights has been the lack of 
meaningful intergovernmental enforcement mechanisms. Paris 
197. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 19, 1996). 
198. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. 
§2242(a)(I)(B)(1988). The United States Trade Representative identifies a priority list 
of the most egregious national intellectual property offenders. These are potentially 
subject to sanctions and the withholding of generalized system of preferences (GSP) 
privileges. There also is a watch list of other national intellectual property offenders. 
See, GATT's Dunkel Criticizes U.S. Section 301, Urges Strong Commitment to Uruguay 
Round, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 766 (May 30, 1990). 
199. See 19 U.S.C. section 1337 (1988). See also Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1176-79, section 1302 
(1989). The United States' initiation of proceedings against Thailand in 1991 in part 
caused the new Thai patent and copyright laws. See Myles Getlan, TRIPs and the 
Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUMBIA 
J. oFTRANsNAT'LL.173, 196-199 (1995). 
200. Reg. 264184, 1984 O.J. (L 25211). See also Getlan, supra note 199, at 218. 
201. Cross-retaliation means retaliation in another sector (e.g., trade in goods) than 
the one in which the original problem (e.g., intellectual property) occurs. 
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and Berne have failed to provide real enforcement devices and, 
until the TRIPs Agreement, intellectual property has not been 
part of GATT. Though members can theoretically bring actions 
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), this route to 
intellectual property dispute settlement has never been 
chosen. 202 
2. The TRIPs Agreement 
The TRIPs Agreement provides a two-fold government-to-
government enforcement mechanism to resolve intellectual 
property protection between nations. The first mechanism is 
the newly created TRIPs Counci1.203 It is charged with 
monitoring domestic implementation,204 providing a forum for 
consultations and assistance,205 and reviewing new 
developments which may warrant modifications to or 
amendments of the TRIPs Agreement.206 
The second mechanism involves procedures to resolve 
intergovernmental disputes through the new Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU)207 administered by the newly 
established WTO. The objective of the DSU is to resolve 
disputes within one year through a process of bilateral 
consultations, a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), panels, 
investigations, panel reports, appeals, and compliance or 
settlement. All WTO members must abide by the same rules, 
be governed by the same procedures, and be subject to 
authorized sanctions if they fail to effectively act against 
counterfeiting and piracy.208 Retaliation may be authorized for 
failure to comply or settle but is typically limited to the same 
202. Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 28; Berne Convention, supra note 27, art. 
33. 
203. TRIPs Agreement art. 68. 
204. TRIPs Agreement art. 63(2). 
205. TRIPs Agreement arts. 64, 68 and 71. 
206. TRIPs Agreement arts. 68 and 71(1). 
207. The Uruguay Round in 1994 revamped the GATT international dispute 
resolution process. See DSU, supra note 26 
208. The TRIPs Agreement requires intergovernmental disputes to be resolved by 
this new WTO process. See the TRIPs Agreement art. 64. 
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sector.209 Members injured by conflicting domestic proceedings 
may seek redress or nullification.210 
3. Implications 
The TRIPs Agreement's two-fold dispute resolution mechanism 
should represent a substantial change from past intellectual 
property dispute practices. The new Council presents at least 
the possibility of an inherent mechanism by which sui generis 
protection can be provided as new technologies arise. Though 
the WTO dispute resolution process is new, and it remains to 
be seen whether its provisions will effectively enforce the 
TRIPs Agreemellt, the DSU system appears to be a significant 
improvement over the past GATT procedure. It provides 
needed streamlining211 and formalization of the dispute 
resolution process, and makes evasionary tactics less likely to 
succeed.212 The DSU mechanism is also more likely to be 
utilized by and against ASEAN nations than past systema213 
and may be more effective than the present bilateral trade-
based approach to intellectual property dispute resolution.214 
It appears the DSU, together with the TRIPs Agreement, will 
facilitate new international agreements. One result is the 
ASEAN Framework Agreement which creates a more direct 
role for ASEAN as a regional organization in resolving 
intellectual property disputes at least among ASEAN 
members.215 The TRIPs Agreement together with the DSU 
209. DSU, supra note 26, arts. 3(7) and 22. 
210. TRIPs Agreement art. 23(2). 
211. GATT cases under the old dispute settlement mechanism frequently suffered 
from extreme politicization and long delays. See Leaffer, supra note 18, at 301-302. See 
also Getlan, supra note 199, at 212. 
212. In the past, defendant states could block implementation of panel decisions. It 
is now more difficult to veto panel reports. 
213. The new system has begun to function and a seven-member appellate World 
Trade Court has more than a dozen disputes now pending. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 
The Concept of Market Contestability and the New Agenda of the Multilateral Trading 
System, 11 ASIL INSIGHT 1 (1996). 
214. The idea is that sanctions authorized by an international body have more 
clout. See Getlan, supra note 199, at 218. 
215. The ASEAN Framework Agreement provides a dispute settlement mechanism 
with several levels of consultation and cooperation. See ASEAN Framework 
Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5. This dispute resolution mechanism may be limited by 
the little or no history of ASEAN intergovernmental intellectual property dispute 
33
Wilson: TRIPS Agreement Implications
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
1997] TRIPS AGREEMENT IMPLICATIONS 51 
mechanism has also facilitated a recent WTO agreement with 
WIPO.216 
While the DSU offers certain advantages it also may prove 
disadvantageous to developed nations and legitimate computer 
technology companies. One problem is that the new WTO 
system precludes unilateral action once the TRIPs Agreement 
is fully implemented and may preclude it during the transition 
period.217 ASEAN members contend, and they may represent 
the WTO majority view, that the DSU entirely precludes 
unilateral economic sanctions to coerce intellectual property 
compliance218 and that transition periods are grace periods,219 
Without bilateral pressure and the threat of unilateral 
sanctions ASEAN nations may not continue to step up 
intellectual property protection.220 Europe is impatient with 
intellectual property violations and weak enforcement; and the 
United States has already warned that it will press developing 
nations to accelerate the TRIPs Agreement implementation 
resolution, lack of ASEAN supra-national authority, and lack of a requirement that 
ASEAN members submit all intellectual property proposals and laws for the TRIPs 
Agreement scrutiny and Framework Agreement compliance verification. Though the 
consultation method of dispute resolution helps ensure stable relationships among 
ASEAN members, it may also restrict movement forward. 
216. The WTO and WIPO, a specialized agency of the United Nations which has 
administered multilateral agreements on intellectual property rights including the 
Paris and Berne Conventions, see Convention Establishing the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, 21 U.S.T. 1749; 828 U.N.I.T.S. 3 (1967), agreed in June 1996 to 
create a special emergency dispute resolution mechanism using the international 
arbitration center in Geneva. See Blatt, supra note 20 (July 4, 1996). 
217. See supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text. 
218. See TRIPs Agreement arts. 23(1) and 64(2). See also GATT art. XXIII(1)(b),(c) 
and DSU, supra note 26, art. 26. 
219. Implementation deadlines are 2000 and 2005 for developing nations. See supra 
notes 31-36 and accompanying text. ASEAN developing nations are undoubtedly aware 
they may demand compensation or request authorizations to retaliate if Europe and 
the United States continue in their bilateral trade-based approaches. See TRIPs 
Agreement arts. 22 and 23. 
220. The majority of Bangkok Chulalongkorn University law school professors 
believe Thai patent and copyright evolvement of the past five years would not have 
occurred but for Section 301 coercion. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 19, 1996). Some 
argue the WTO system will prove counterproductive by removing or impeding valuable 
coercion. See Doane, supra note 67, at 482. Others argue that the United States and 
Europe will achieve better results through utilizing the improved WTO dispute 
resolution process than through their unilateral retaliatory actions of the past. See 
Getlan, supra note 199, at 217. 
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and will continue to rely on Special 301 procedures to 
bilaterally confront nations until they have fully implemented 
the TRIPs Agreement.221 
The DSU may also prove disadvantageous to developed nations 
in other ways. It provides a state-to-state mechanism only, so 
private individuals with intellectual property grievances 
against ASEAN nations will still need to look to other less 
predictable enforcement mechanisms.222 The DSU also may 
restrict the cross sector retaliation some believe is necessary to 
achieve ASEAN intellectual property protection of computer 
technology.223 
v. THE FUTURE OF ASEAN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 
PROTECTION 
The TRIPs Agreement represents a breakthrough in ASEAN 
and global intellectual property protection. By establishing 
minimal standards - a prerequisite and the foundation for 
future global and ASEAN harmonization - the TRIPs 
Agreement creates a framework by which ASEAN nations can 
work together to fulfill the requirements of the TRIPs 
Agreement and the ASEAN Framework Agreement. 
More intellectual property barriers remain in Southeast Asia 
than in many other parts of the world.224 ASEAN members are 
required by the TRIPs Agreement to make significant changes 
in the way computer technology rights are protected and 
enforced. Patent, copyright, sui generis, and trade secret laws 
reqUIre substantial changes to comply with minimum 
221. See note 10, at 5. 
222. For example, private individuals may sue the offending nations, sue and seek 
enjoinment in their home countries, or seek seizures and exclusions of the offending 
goods at their domestic borders. 
223. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 19, 1996). Though the DSU requires same-
sector retaliation as a starting point, this may be a non-limitator. Successful litigants 
may be entitled to apply cross-sectoral retaliatory sanctions to offset economic losses 
caused by intellectual property. See TRIPs Agreement arts. 64 and 68. See also DSU, 
supra note 26, arts. 3(7), 6-16,17-20,22(3), 22(3)(fXili) and 22(g)(ili). 
224. Television interview of Mr. Kantor, United States Secretary of Commerce, 
World Business Today, CNN International (June 26,1996). 
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substantive standards now required for all ASEAN members.225 
The TRIPs Agreement procedural requirements will represent 
the largest changes. 
The TRIPs Agreement and the ASEAN Framework Agreement 
recognize that technical assistance is critical to effective 
intellectual property laws,226 but technical assistance and 
strong laws alone will not be enough. ASEAN governments will 
need to devote significant resources and create adequate 
infrastructure if strong laws are going to have a real effect.227 
They will also need to educate their people about these 
intellectual property laws and their benefits. 
As pragmatism is necessary if ASEAN nations are to progress 
toward a high-technology future and attract much-needed 
foreign investment and trade,228 ASEAN intellectual property 
protection and enforcement will likely move from ideology229 to 
economic and political reality. The ASEAN Framework 
Agreement, other bilateral agreements,230 and recent ASEAN 
domestic law changes231 create at least a strong positive 
appearance that ASEAN members are convinced of or resigned 
to the reality that adequate intellectual property protection is a 
225. Vietnam is indirectly obligated to comply with the TRIPs Agreement by its 
ASEAN Framework Agreement obligations. 
226. For example, Indonesia presently lacks intellectual property protection but 
has requested assistance. United States governmental experts are assisting it in 
drafting laws. See supra note 10, at 5 and 10. See also ASEAN Framework Agreement, 
supra note 6. 
227. See note 10, at 5, 10-11. 
228. See ASEAN Framework Agreement, supra note 6, preamble. 
229. ASEAN cultural and economic factors have traditionally placed a low 
emphasis on intellectual property and other individual rights. See supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. 
230. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Cooperation in the Field 
of Intellectual Property Between Thailand and Laos. A similar memorandum was 
established with Vietnam in 1994, and is being or has been established regarding 
China, Cambodia, and Burma. See TranBat Nguyen & Nghiem Xuan Bac Pham, 
Vietnam, IP ASIA 1994 HIGHLIGHTS 38 (1994). 
231. Thailand's new and the Philippines' pending copyright, trademark, and patent 
laws together with at least Indonesia's and Thailand's commitment to comply with the 
TRIPs Agreement on an expedited basis are positive indicators ASEAN members are in 
fact serious about intellectual property protection of computer technology. See supra 
note 10, at 10. See also Thai Patents Act, supra note 44; Thai Trademarks Act, supra 
note 135, and Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43. 
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prerequisite for effective trade and investment competition in 
the global marketplace.232 
Competition is fierce among countries to attract foreign 
investment233 and as ASEAN nations promise to be an 
increasingly large export market for United States and 
European products, intellectual property protection will 
become increasingly important. Though ASEAN's largest 
foreign investor, China,234 is an unlikely or ironic source of 
demands, other major trading partners235 are likely to insist on 
more fair and equal trade terms than they have in the past, 
particularly as computer technology industries play a greater 
role in national competitiveness.236 Growing demands may also 
come from ASEAN members like Singapore, Thailand, and 
Malaysia, which have discovered that they have their own 
homegrown computer technology to protect. 
If there is reluctance to protect intellectual property among 
certain ASEAN members,237 perhaps they can learn from the 
experience of member Singapore which has significantly 
increased its intellectual property protection in recent years. 
Singapore has successfully leapfrogged over the industrial 
stage and has attracted investment by multinational computer 
and telecommunications giants Motorola, AT&T, Digital 
232. Though some developing nations resent the TRIPs Agreement requirements 
largely imposed on them by developed nations and enjoy the benefits of maximum 
access to computer technology and the thriving parallel counterfeit and pirate markets, 
the Framework Agreement recognizes that economic progress and prosperity for 
members, entrepreneurs, and innovators will be fostered by enhanced intellectual 
property and related field protection together with closer cooperation and consultation 
among ASEAN parties for mutual gain in intellectual property and related fields. See 
ASEAN Framework Agreement preamble, art. 2(5). See also Sucharitkul, supra note 
40; Bronckers, supra note 24, at 1246-1247 and 1249. 
233. See NAISBETr, supra note 2, at 108-109. 
234. Ethnic Chinese are the largest foreign investors in Thailand, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam and represent 81% of Thailand's and Singapore's, 
73% of Indonesia's, 62% of Malaysia's, and 50% of the Philippine's listed companies. 
See NAISBETT, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
235. For example, the United States, Japan and Europe. 
236. See supra note 10, at 2, 3 (Jan. 27, 1996) 
237. Some developing nations resent the TRIPs Agreement requirements largely 
imposed on them by developed nations and enjoy the benefits of maximum access to 
computer technology and the thriving parallel counterfeit and private markets. See 
Bronckers, supra note 24, at 1246-1247, 1249. 
37
Wilson: TRIPS Agreement Implications
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
1997] TRIPS AGREEMENT IMPLICATIONS 55 
Equipment, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and Matsushita. Though 
the selection of Singapore by these global companies has been 
for several reasons,238 Singapore has the unusual distinction of 
shifting from imports to indigenous technologies and attracting 
recent, serious foreign technology investment.239 
Some issues remain. Though the TRIPs Agreement provides a 
mechanism for adjusting international intellectual property 
protection to meet the evolving needs of computer technology, 
the TRIPs Agreement, the ASEAN Framework Agreement, and 
other international organizations may not necessarily be able 
to develop standards to meet changes in future technology. 
Another concern is whether the TRIPs Agreement and the DSU 
will be able to effectively compel noncomplying ASEAN nations 
to recognize and enforce intellectual property rights. Only time 
will tell how these remaining issues will be answered and 
whether major ASEAN trading partners can rely on 
multilateral efforts, including the TRIPs Agreement and the 
Framework Agreement, to effectively improve ASEAN 
intellectual property regimes and achieve trade objectives 
regarding computer technology. 
238. For example, Singapore has the best transportation infrastructure, research 
and development incentives, and tax structure of ASEAN members. See NAISBETT, 
supra note 2, at 175. 
239. See Bronckers, supra note 24, at 172-173. 
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